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A POSTMORTEM FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
AGAINST BUSINESS METHOD PATENT
INFRINGEMENT IN THE WAKE OF
EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE
[I]njunctive relief may have different consequences for the bur-
geoning number of patents over business methods .... The poten-
tial vagueness and suspect validity of some of these patents may
affect the calculus under the four-factor test.1
INTRODUCTION
Have you ever viewed a check you had written using your online
checking account, bid for something on eBay, or used the "l-Click"
feature on Amazon.com to purchase a new book? If you answered
yes to any of these questions, you have used technology contained in a
"business method" patent. 2 Business method patents are awarded for
business-related processes that produce "useful, concrete and tangible
result[s]." ' 3 These results are not limited to any particular form, but
depend upon the claim language, which defines the "metes and
bounds" of a patent.4 This inherent ambiguity has fueled the expan-
sive use of business method patents, while drawing the ire of judges
and academics alike. 5
A patent is a government-sponsored monopoly that allows its
holder to "exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or sell-
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
2. Frequently used business methods are numerous. The following list is illustrative:
[1] Netscape Communications Corporation's patent directed to secure processing of
on-line business transactions.
[2] CyberGold's patent directed to the practice of paying consumers to look at adver-
tisements on the Internet.
[3] Priceline.com's patent directed to reverse seller's auctions on the Internet.
[6] Citibank N.A.'s three patents directed to a method for [a] acquiring and [b] present-
ing an electronic credential using a customer trust agent, an authority trust agent and a
host processor, and [c] a system for open electronic commerce where both customers
and merchants can securely transact using [a] and [b].
Steven L. Friedman et al., State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc.: At the Intersection of Technology, Commerce and the Law, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSLET-
TER 8, 15 (Spring 1999).
3. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368. 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
4. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
5. See infra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
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ing the [patented] invention."'6 If a court determines that another
party has infringed upon any of these rights, the court may issue a
permanent injunction to prevent further infringement. 7 Over the past
twenty years, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has granted
permanent injunctions after finding patent validity and infringement,
"unless there is a sufficient reason for denying [them]."' 8 In eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the auto-
matic injunction tendency, holding that a court must instead use tradi-
tional equitable considerations when determining whether to issue a
permanent injunction.9
This Note argues that eBay placed an insurmountable burden on
business method patent owners seeking permanent injunctions to en-
force their intellectual property rights. Business method patent own-
ers will find themselves unable to satisfy any of the four traditional
equitable considerations required for a court to grant a permanent
injunction.' 0 First, they will be unable to establish irreparable harm
due to the intrinsic nature of business methods, which precludes
courts from finding the traditional indicia of irreparable harm." Sec-
ond, business method patent owners will be unable to prove the inad-
equacy of remedies available at law because of the inherent
differences between business methods and other technologies.
12
Third, a business method patentee will be unable to tip the scales of
equity in her favor, because an infringing party will likely be injured as
much as, if not more than, the patentee if a permanent injunction
were to issue. 13 Finally, as technology progresses and business meth-
ods become a greater part of public life, the public's interest in keep-
ing widely used and infringing business methods in operation will
outweigh the public's interest in enforcing the patent holder's rights.
14
6. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
7. § 283.
8. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
9. 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
10. The eBay Court enumerated the equitable considerations:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id. at 1839 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987): Weinberger v. Ro-
mero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982)).
11. See infra notes 173-195 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 216-222 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 223-231 and accompanying text.
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Part II provides a background of process patents and explains how
business methods fit within the statutory provision making processes
patentable subject matter.' 5 It also discusses the history of business
method patents, particularly emphasizing the watershed case of State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 16 Finally,
Part II offers a brief synopsis of the state of permanent injunctions
prior to eBay and the equitable considerations in both patent and non-
patent cases.1 7 Part III presents this Note's subject opinion: eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.18 Part IV analyzes the eBay Court's
reasoning and the policies embodied in that decision. 19 It then criti-
cally examines the opinion and finds that the Supreme Court distin-
guished business methods from other technologies, unfairly
prejudicing trial courts against business method patent owners. 20
Next, Part V argues that this decision will place an insurmountable
burden in the path of business method patent holders seeking to ob-
tain permanent injunctions.21 Finally, Part VI concludes that, while
the long-term response to business method patents is uncertain, eBay
will have the immediate impact of deterring district courts from
awarding injunctive relief for business method patent infringement. 22
II. BACKGROUND
Business method patents are process patents that typically cover the
way a business is "structured, managed, organized [or] carried out. ' 23
Both business methods and processes have endured many challenges
regarding whether the government should award patents for these
technologies.2 4 This Part provides a background of process patents,
business methods, and the permanent injunctive relief available for
infringement of these types of patents.2 5
15. See infra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
16. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also infra
17. See infra notes 70-101 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 102-147 and accompanying tex
19. See infra notes 148-171 and accompanying tex
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 172-231 and accompanying text
22. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
23. Michael E. Melton, The Business of Business A
2000).
24. See infra notes 26-69 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 26-101 and accompanying text.
notes 47-69 and accompanying text.
t.
t.
4ethod Patents, 589 PLI/PAT 97, 103 (Feb.
2008]
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A. The History of Process Patents
In obtaining a patent, an inventor must first show that his invention
falls into one of the four classes provided in 35 U.S.C. § 101. These
four classes-process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter-define the realm of patentable subject matter. 26 If the invention
falls within the range of patentable subject matter, it must then satisfy
the statutorily prescribed requirements of patentability: novelty, util-
ity, and nonobviousness. 27
A patentable process has been described as "an operation or series
of steps leading to a useful result. ' 28 However, the intangible nature
of processes has led to confusion over what types of processes fit
within the statutory definition of patentable subject matter.29 Early
cases discussing patentable processes dealt with chemical processes,
but eventually the scope of protection was expanded to include those
processes within the mechanical arts as well. 30  The U.S. Supreme
Court has made clear that process patents cannot consist exclusively
of laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract intellectual con-
cepts.3' However, a process that utilizes these "abstract ideas" is not
per se unpatentable subject matter.32
The Federal Circuit clarified statutory subject matter for process
patents by holding that a set of data-manipulating algorithms could be
patentable subject matter if it produced a "useful, concrete and tangi-
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
27. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) ("[Pjatentability is dependent upon three
explicit conditions: novelty and utility as articulated and defined in [35 U.S.C.] § 101 and [35
U.S.C.] § 102. and nonobviousness, the new statutory formulation, as set out in [35 U.S.C.]
§ 103.").
28. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03 (2007).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
30. See Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 385-86 (1909) ("We therefore reach
the conclusion that an invention or discovery of a process or method involving mechanical oper-
ations, and producing a new and useful result. may be within the protection of the Federal stat-
ute, and entitle the inventor to a patent for his discovery."); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 252, 268 (1853) ("But it is well settled that a man cannot have a patent for the function or
abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine which produces it.").
31. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63. 67 (1972). See Mark E. Wojcik, The Perilous Process of
Protecting Process Patents from Infringing Importations, 14 Loy. L.A, INT'L & COMP. L.J. 207,
211 (1992) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing some forms of patentable processes from un-
patentable principles).
32. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) ("[A]n application of a law of nature or math-
ematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."
(emphasis in original)).
[Vol. 57:607
2008] EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE
ble result."'33 Early cases applying this standard dealt with processes
performed on machines, such as computers.34 The Federal Circuit
subsequently stated that some algorithms could be patentable subject
matter, even if the inventor merely claimed the process independently
of the computer implementing it.35
B. Business Method Patents
Until the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. ,36 practitioners commonly believed
that business methods were not statutory subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and were therefore unpatentable. 37 Additionally, Hotel
Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co. was understood to have estab-
lished a business method exception to statutory subject matter, ren-
dering business methods unpatentable. 38  Lorraine Co. involved a
method for "cash-registering and account-checking designed to pre-
vent fraud[ ] ... by waiters and cashiers. ' 39 The Second Circuit found
that a method of doing business could not be statutory subject mat-
ter. 40  The Patent Office and subsequent courts relied on this
position. 41
The proliferation of computers in the business world throughout the
1960s and 1970s replaced many tasks done by hand and prompted
businesses to seek protection for their computerized methods.42 In In
re Johnston, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 43 took the first
33. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding as a "machine" claim a
computer that performed algorithms to smooth a waveform on an oscilloscope display).
34. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
35. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
36. 149 F.3d 1368.
37. See Brieanna Dolmage, Note, The Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter in the United
States, 27 WHIrIER L. REV. 1023, 1026-36 (2006) (discussing the history of the mathematical
algorithm and business method exceptions).
38. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
39. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 469 ("A system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out
the system is not ... an art."). See Thomas R. Makin, Hotel Checking: You Can Check Out Any
Time You Want, But Can You Ever Leave? The Patenting of Business Methods, 24 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 93, 95 (2001) ("Hotel Security did express something of a subject matter-based
aversion to business method patents, focusing on the incongruity of calling a business method an
'art' .... ).
41. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (noting that prior versions of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures had a regula-
tion allowing examiners to reject business method patents for a lack of statutory subject matter).
42. 1 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 1.03[5].
43. In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit by merging the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See H.R. REP. No. 109-407, at 3 (2006).
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steps toward patenting business methods employed on computers
when it upheld as statutory subject matter a machine claim that used a
series of steps to provide bookkeeping services. 44 The number of
businesses seeking patent protection continued to increase throughout
the late twentieth century, as the Internet revolution of the 1990s
flooded the patent office and the judiciary.45 This prompted Judge
Newman of the Federal Circuit to write a stinging dissent in In re
Shrader, calling for the abolition of all protection afforded business
methods.46
Much to the dismay of Judge Newman, the Federal Circuit went in
the opposite direction in State Street, expressly abolishing the business
method exception.47 Defendant Signature Financial Group, Inc. was
the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (the '056 patent), which
claimed a data processing system allowing mutual funds ("spokes") to
combine their assets into a portfolio ("hub"). 48 The hub and spoke
system allowed mutual funds to form partnerships within a hub, giving
the benefits of a consolidated management of assets and the tax ad-
vantages of a partnership.49 The system permitted mutual fund ad-
ministrators to monitor their mutual funds' investments within the
hub and calculate the value of its assets down to the value of its shares
within the hub.50
Plaintiff State Street Bank & Trust Co. entered into talks with Sig-
nature to license the '056 patent.51 However, negotiations failed, and
State Street brought a declaratory judgment action claiming patent
invalidity.52 The district court granted State Street's motion for sum-
mary judgment declaring invalidity, holding that the system was not
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 53 The district court
44. 502 F.2d 765, 771 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
45. See Ichiro Kobayashi, Private Contracting and Business Models of Electronic Commerce,
13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 161, 162-63 (2005) (describing the surge in business method patents
that occurred post-State Street and during the dot-corn bubble).
46. 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("I discern no purpose in per-
petuating a poorly defined, redundant, and unnecessary 'business methods' exception, indeed
enlarging (and enhancing the fuzziness of) that exception and applying it in this case.").
47. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998). See generally Joseph Robert Brown, Jr., Note, Software Patent Dynamics: Software as
Patentable Subject Matter After State Street Bank & Trust Co., 25 OKLA. Crrv U. L. REV. 639,
640 (2000); Colin P. Marks, Note, Opening the Door to Business Methods: State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 37 Hous. L. REV. 923, 944-47 (2000).
48. State St., 149 F.3d at 1370.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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construed the means-plus-function 54 claims to be directed to a process
that fell under the mathematical algorithm exception or, alternatively,
the business method exception. 55 After referencing several cases, in-
cluding Lorraine Co., to establish the existence of these exceptions,
the court held that it did not matter which exception the '056 patent
fell under, because the patent encompassed too broad a spectrum of
accounting methods.56
The Federal Circuit rejected the district court's claim interpretation,
stating that, when determining whether a claim contains statutory sub-
ject matter, it is irrelevant whether the claim describes a process or a
machine, because both are enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 101. 57 Never-
theless, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the means-plus-function
claims constituted structures within a machine that performed the
processes.5 8 It then addressed the exceptions to statutory subject mat-
ter referenced by the district court. First, the Federal Circuit found
that the district court incorrectly applied the mathematical algorithm
exception to the system.59 Next, the court contrasted the nonstatutory
subject matter of an abstract mathematical idea with the statutory
subject matter of a mathematical process that produces a "useful, con-
crete and tangible result. '60 The court held that the system was in the
latter category, because its mathematical algorithms processed finan-
cial information into the "useful, concrete and tangible result" of a
final share price.61
After distinguishing the system from a mathematical algorithm, the
Federal Circuit turned to the business method exception. The court
took "[the] opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest" and
54. A means-plus-function claim allows a patent applicant to claim many different ways to
perform a function. For example, if a patent was directed to a camera and its flash device, the
drafter may use a means-plus-function claim to cover more than one way of connecting the
camera to the flash. Means-plus-function claims are statutorily permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 112
6, but the means that may be claimed to perform a specific purpose are not unlimited. The
second clause of § 112 1 6 directs a court or examiner to limit the possible means of accomplish-
ing the function to those "structures, materials or acts," and their equivalents, described in the
patent specification. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW
556-57 (2d ed. 2003).
55. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 513-17 (D.
Mass. 1996).
56. Id. at 515-17.
57. State St., 149 F.3d at 1372.
58. Id. at 1371.
59. Id. at 1373-74.
60. Id. at 1375 (citing the mathematical operations in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir.
1994), which produced the "useful, concrete and tangible" result of a smooth waveform display
on a rasterizer monitor).
61. Id.
2008]
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hypothesized that the exception's genesis lay within the now-defunct
"requirement for invention" test.62 The Federal Circuit analyzed case
law involving business method patents and concluded that neither it
nor its predecessor court had relied on the business method exception
to invalidate the patents at issue. 63 Instead, the patents were invali-
dated on other statutory grounds, such as obviousness, lack of novelty,
or merely being an abstract idea. 64 Even Lorraine Co., the case
credited with establishing the business method exception, invalidated
the patent at issue for lack of novelty and invention-not lack of stat-
utory subject matter. 65 Thus, the Federal Circuit unequivocally abol-
ished the business method exception and removed it from statutory
subject matter analysis. 66
Signature failed to counterclaim for patent infringement at the dis-
trict court level and was therefore precluded from seeking injunctive
relief upon remand.67 If Signature had counterclaimed for infringe-
ment and sought permanent injunctive relief, the district court would
have applied the Federal Circuit's test for permanent injunctions prev-
alent in the late 1990s. At that time, the Federal Circuit was backing
away from its late-1980s approach, in which a permanent injunction
would generally issue after a finding of patent validity and infringe-
ment.68 Instead, the Federal Circuit began stressing that a district
court must weigh equitable considerations before awarding a perma-
nent injunction. 69
62. Id.
63. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375. See Zainabu Rumala, Comment, Interpretation Spawns Re-
thinking of Patent Law: A Jurisprudential Review of the Courts' Treatment of Software Patents, 1
J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 113, 120 (2006).
64. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 291-92 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (af-
firming the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' rejection
of claims describing a "novel way of conducting auctions," because the claims were simply a
"mathematical algorithm that [was] not applied to or limited by physical elements or process
steps"): In re Howard, 394 F.2d 869, 871 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (invalidating a patent for lack of
novelty).
65. State St., 149 F.3d at 1376 (citing Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.. 160 F. 467 (2d
Cir. 1908)).
66. Id. at 1377. The reasoning in State Street was subsequently extended to cover a business
method patent claiming a process independent of any machine. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Commc'ns, Inc.. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (upholding process claims for a method of in-
serting call data into a long-distance telephone call).
67. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 516 (D. Mass.
1996). Instead, Signature filed two counterclaims: "(1) a damages claim against State Street for
bringing what Signature alleges to have been frivolous litigation and falsely claiming that its
patent was invalid (Count I): and (2) a declaration that State Street is bound by an oral licensing
agreement over use of the data processing system (Count 11)." Id.
68. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
69. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp.. 185 F.3d 1259. 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[The court]
also recognize[s] that district courts, as befits a question of equity, enjoy considerable discretion
[Vol. 57:607
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C. Permanent Injunctions
A court sitting in equity may order injunctive relief to either pro-
hibit a party from acting or to compel a party to act in a certain man-
ner.70 A permanent injunction is a form of injunctive relief that a
court may award after it has entered a final judgment.71 The primary
purpose of a permanent injunction is to restrain a party from "doing
that which he has no legal or equitable right to do" 72 for as long as
harm may result.73 A permanent injunction is a particularly powerful
remedy; thus, courts grant such relief only to protect property rights
against irreparable damage. 74 A permanent injunction does not issue
automatically, but is ordinarily granted only after equitable considera-
tion of the facts in a particular case. 75 The equitable practice of issu-
ing injunctions derives not from statutory authority, but from several
hundred years of common law.76 The Supreme Court has distilled the
common law requirements for an injunction into four equitable fac-
tors that a party must establish after prevailing on the merits. 77 None
of these four factors is dispositive; rather, each should be weighed in
relation to the others, so that a weakness in one may be made up for
by the strength of another. 78
in determining whether the facts of a situation require it to issue an injunction."); Kearns v.
Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cit. 1994) ("[E]ntitlement to an injunction implement-
ing the right to exclude, as compared with only assessing damages against an infringer, is not
absolute even during the life of a patent, but is discretionary.").
70. 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 1 (2004).
71. B & P Enters. v. Overland Equip. Co., 758 A.2d 1026, 1051 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
72. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 134, 133 F.2d 955, 957
(7th Cir. 1943).
73. Condura Constr. Co. v. Milwaukee Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL, 99 N.W.2d 751,
754 (Wisc. 1959). See 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 11 (2004).
74. Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919).
75. City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1933).
76. Hecht Co. v. Bowles. 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
77. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo. 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982). The four traditional equita-
ble principles expressed in Weinberger have been summarized as follows:
Issuance of injunctive relief against [the defendants] is governed by traditional equita-
ble principles, which require consideration of (i) whether the plaintiff would face irrep-
arable injury if the injunction did not issue, (ii) whether the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law, (iii) whether granting the injunction is in the public interest, and (iv)
whether the balance of the hardships tips in the plaintiffs favor.
Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (E.D. Va. 1998), affd, 185 F.3d 1259
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
78. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (ap-
plying the four-factor test from Weinberger in addressing the issuance of a preliminary
injunction).
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The cornerstone, and hence the first factor, of any type of injunctive
relief is irreparable injury. 79 An irreparable injury cannot be repaired,
atoned for,80 or remedied by monetary damages alone.81 Although
economic damages that have remedies at law are not normally consid-
ered irreparable, "impossibility of proof has long been recognized as
bearing upon adequacy of the legal remedy. ' '82 A court may find it
difficult to determine whether the party sought to be enjoined contrib-
uted to the injury, but it must consider all of the equities in deciding
whether irreparable injury has in fact occurred. Absent legislative in-
tent to the contrary, the court cannot use a hard-and-fast rule or a
presumption of irreparable harm in a particular case.83
The second major equitable consideration is the inadequacy of rem-
edies available at law.84 The "inadequacy of damages" concept is
often difficult to distinguish from "irreparable injury, '8 5 especially be-
cause irreparable harm is frequently used to establish an inadequacy
of remedies available at law. 86 One way of separating the two is by
using irreparable harm as a "trigger" for an equitable remedy inquiry,
whereas the inadequacy of remedies at law is a prospective test to
assess the efficacy of the equitable remedy.8 7 When a court analyzes a
motion for injunctive relief, any inability to quantify damages will al-
ways weigh against the adequacy of remedies at law.88 Available legal
remedies do not have to fail in all aspects of preventing further harm,
but must be "seriously deficient" when compared to the damages that
the plaintiff would continue to suffer. 89 Inadequacy of remedies, like
irreparable injury, is an equitable consideration that must involve a
79. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312.
80. Graham v. Med. Mut., 130 F.3d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1997).
81. See Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 471 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Mere
financial injury, however, will not constitute irreparable harm if adequate compensatory relief
will be available in the course of litigation."); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596
F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) ("For it has always been true that irreparable injury means injury for
which a monetary award cannot be adequate compensation and that where money damages is
adequate compensation a preliminary injunction will not issue.").
82. Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that a court may find
irreparable harm where economic rights are involved and damages are unduly speculative).
83. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544-45 (1987). The Court held that the Ninth
Circuit incorrectly presumed irreparable damage where a government agency failed to evaluate
the environmental impact of its actions. Id. at 541-46.
84. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312.
85. 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 71 (2004) (citing Lewis v. S.S. Baune. 534 F.2d 1115, 1124 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
86. Id.
87. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d at 1124.
88. Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975).
89. Foodcomm Int'l v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that no remedy existed
at law to adequately compensate damage to business relationships). Accord Justice v. United
[Vol. 57:607
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case-specific investigation into the effectiveness, timeliness, and com-
pleteness of all remedial options.90
Third, the court must balance the hardships between the parties.9'
If the potential hardship on the party to be enjoined is greater than
the potential relief received by the party requesting the injunction, all
other factors being equal, an injunction will not issue.92 Courts have
found situations where there is an undeniable interference with a
party's property rights, but the compensation awarded for the inter-
ference and the significant hardship involved in ending the interfer-
ence were enough to outweigh the continued injury.93
The fourth equitable consideration is whether the issuance of a per-
manent injunction is against the public interest.94 The public interest
normally weighs in favor of the party asserting its property rights.95
However, it may weigh against the party trying to assert its rights if an
injunction will negatively affect public health or safety.96
D. The Pre-eBay Test for Permanent Injunctions against Business
Method Patent Infringement
From the late 1980s until the early 2000s, a line of patent law cases
slowly diverged from this traditional four-factor approach and created
several presumptive standards regarding permanent injunctions.97
Because the right to exclude others from one's intellectual property is
an essential right of that property, these cases concluded that with-
States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1482 & n.16 (11th Cir. 1993) (denying a lack of remedies at law due to the
presence of a legal cause of action).
90. See 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 72 (2004).
91. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) ("[T]he court 'balances the con-
veniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the
granting or withholding of the injunction."' (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414. 440
(1944))). See David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Bal-
ancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 671 (1988).
92. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 952, 959-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
93. City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933).
94. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312-13.
95. Jacobson v. Cox Paving Co., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641, 1657 (D. Ariz. 1991).
96. See Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 786 F.2d 398, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming a dis-
trict court's denial of a preliminary injunction against a patent infringer on the grounds that
many physicians preferred the infringing product and that enjoining its use would harm the pub-
lic). The oft-cited case of City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934),
provides another illustration of public policy outweighing a patentee's rights. See id. at 593.
97. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp., 370 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The district
court's order states that it 'finds no sound reason for denying the injunction.' While this state-
ment does not explicitly set forth detailed reasons, the district court properly granted the injunc-
tion because LabCorp was found to infringe." (emphasis added)); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor
Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d
1275. 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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holding injunctive relief impermissibly allows an infringer to violate
an essential right granted by a patent.98 However, before eBay, dis-
trict courts did not, as a whole, apply any uniform rule for permanent
injunctions. 99 This included the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia-where the eBay case began-which used
the traditional equitable four-factor test to decide whether to grant
MercExchange's motion for a permanent injunction.100 The Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that an injunction will issue in a patent in-
fringement case once there has been a determination of patent valid-
ity and infringement. 10 1
III. SUBJECT OPINION: EBAY, INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L.L.C.
The eBay Court reinstated the four traditional equitable factors for
permanent injunctions into the realm of patent law.10 2 The Supreme
Court also struck down certain "expansive principles" used by the dis-
trict court and Federal Circuit in their permanent injunction analy-
ses.103 It found that general rules regarding a patent holder's
willingness to license her patent, a failure to practice her patent, or
automatic issuance of an injunction after a finding of validity and in-
fringement all contradicted principles of equity in too broad a "swath
of cases. 104 The Court determined that neither of the courts below
had correctly applied the traditional equitable considerations. Thus, it
remanded without deciding whether it should grant injunctive
relief.105
A. History of the Two Companies
Both eBay, Inc. and MercExchange, L.L.C. were founded on the
premise of using the Internet to facilitate auctions for individuals'
goods. In 1994, Tom Woolston, MercExchange's founder, developed
98. Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1246-47.
99. See, e.g., Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540
(D. Del. 2005); Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1075,
1080-81 (S.D. Iowa 2005); Ciena Corp. v. Corvis Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 610, 611-14 (D. Del.
2004).
100. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711 (E.D. Va. 2003). The dis-
trict court used the equitable considerations it had articulated in Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technol-
ogy Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (E.D. Va. 1998).
101. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
102. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
103. Id. at 1840.
104. Id. at 1840-41.
105. Id. at 1841. At the time of this writing, the district court has not yet reached a final
disposition in the case. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Va.
2006).
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the idea of using consignment stores connected by the Internet to sell
goods.106 Mr. Woolston sought patent protection for his idea, filing
the first of three patent applications 10 7 in November 1995.108
On Labor Day weekend in 1995, Pierre M. Omidyar launched an
Internet-based auction service called Auction Web, eBay's predeces-
sor.1 09 Mr. Omidyar did not seek patent protection. However, by
1997, eBay hosted more than 800,000 auctions each day,110 while
MercExchange was still trying to get off the ground. 1 ' As eBay flour-
ished and MercExchange began to derive income solely through li-
censing its patents, MercExchange approached eBay about a licensing
agreement.'12 The negotiations fell through, 113 and MercExchange
sued eBay for infringement in 2002.114
B. Procedural Background
MercExchange sued over eBay's "Buy it Now" function, naming
eBay, its wholly-owned subsidiary, Half.com, Inc., (together "eBay"),
and ReturnBuy, Inc. as defendants.1 15 MercExchange alleged in-
fringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,845,265 ("the '265 patent"),
6,085,176 ("the '176 patent"), and 6,202,051 ("the '051 patent").1 16
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
determined that the '051 patent was invalid, but allowed the question
of infringement for the other two patents to go before a jury.117 The
jury found that eBay had willingly infringed both the '265 and the '176
patents and awarded MercExchange $35 million in damages.118 Fol-
106. Business Briefs, Supreme Court Hands eBay Win in Patent Fight, LINCOLN J. STAR, May
16, 2006, at A4.
107. Consignment Nodes, U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995). The other two pat-
ents were the Method and Apparatus for Using Search Agents to Search Plurality of Markets for
Items, U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed Mar. 8, 1999), and Facilitating Internet Commerce
Through Internetworked Auctions, U.S. Patent No. 6,202,051 (filed Feb. 19, 1999).
108. Julia Wilkinson, The eBay Patent Wars: Interview with MercExchange CEO Thomas
Woolston, AuctionBytes.com (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y04/mO9/
i30/s01.
109. Id.; Hoovers In-Depth Company Records, eBay, Inc., Sept. 20, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 16306350.
110. Hoovers In-Depth Company Records, supra note 109.
111. Wilkinson, supra note 108.
112. William M. Ried & Miwako Hosaka, Supreme Court Abolishes Automatic Injunctions
Against Patent Infringement, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2006, at 14.
113. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
114. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2002).
115. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that
ReturnBuy filed for bankruptcy and entered into a licensing agreement with MercExchange).
116. See supra note 107.
117. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1326.
118. Id.
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lowing the verdict, the district court applied the traditional equitable
considerations for injunctions and denied MercExchange's motion for
a permanent injunction. 19  The district court reasoned that
MercExchange had failed to show irreparable harm, because it did not
practice its inventions and existed merely to license its patents. 1 20 The
court also found that MercExchange was unable to prove that licens-
ing was not an adequate remedy due to MercExchange's statements
indicating its willingness to license the patents to eBay.12'
MercExchange could not tip the hardship scales in its favor, nor was it
able to convince the court that the public interest weighed in favor of
an injunction. 122
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a perma-
nent injunction, stating its general rule that a permanent injunction
will issue once "infringement and validity have been adjudged ... ab-
sent exceptional circumstances ... [and] in rare instances ... to pro-
tect the public interest."' 23 Further, the court found that, when a
court awards a permanent injunction to a property owner, it recog-
nizes the owner's right to exclude-"the essence of the concept of
property." 124 Because the right to exclude is not conditioned on the
use of one's property, the Federal Circuit held that MercExchange's
failure to practice its invention could not deprive it of the right to
exclude others from such practice. 25 MercExchange's willingness to
license its patents was also not dispositive, because the leverage a per-
manent injunction gives a patent holder is merely a "natural conse-
quence of the right to exclude."'126
C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas stated that certio-
rari was granted to determine the appropriateness of the Federal Cir-
cuit's general rule in favor of issuing injunctions where a patent has
been found to be valid and infringed. 127 He noted that, historically,
plaintiffs in federal courts had to satisfy a four-factor test before a
119. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711 (E.D. Va. 2003) (quoting
Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
120. Id. at 712.
121. Id. at 713.
122. Id. at 713-14.
123. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338.
124. Id. (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1339.
127. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1838-39 (2006).
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permanent injunction would be granted. 128 The Court reasoned that
these principles should apply to patent cases due to language in the
Patent Act incorporating principles of equity.' 29
The Court then turned to the decisions of the lower courts. It first
addressed the opinion of the Federal Circuit, which had justified its
general rule on permanent injunctions by analogizing the right to ex-
clude others from property to the right to exclude others from practic-
ing a patented invention. 130 The Court explained that the Federal
Circuit had failed to distinguish between the statutorily granted right
to exclude and the penalties for the violation of that right.' 3 ' It noted
that the Patent Act embodies this distinction by providing that injunc-
tions "may" issue to prevent the violation of patent rights. 132 The
Copyright Act uses similar language in its sections pertaining to in-
junctive relief for copyright infringement. 133 Previously, the Court
had rejected an automatic injunction rule following determination of
copyright infringement.134 The similarities between copyrights and
patents were sufficient to convince the Court that any deviation from
the traditional four-factor test would be against both precedent and
the plain language of the Patent Act.' 35
The Court next found that both the district court and the Federal
Circuit had adopted expansive principles that incorrectly precluded a
fact-specific inquiry as required by the four-factor test.136 The district
court generalized that a "plaintiff's willingness to license its patents"
and "its lack of commercial activity in practicing its patents" would
prevent a patent holder from showing irreparable harm. 137 Such a
generalization, the Court reasoned, would unnecessarily deprive cer-
tain types of patent holders of the right to obtain injunctions against
128. Id.; see supra note 10.
129. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)).
130. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338 ("Because the 'right to exclude recognized in a patent is
but the essence of the concept of property,' the general rule is that a permanent injunction will
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged."). See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000)
("[Platents shall have the attributes of personal property."); § 154.
131. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
132. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000).
134. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001); Dun v.
Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908)).
135. Both copyrights and patents (1) grant the right to exclude; (2) are awarded for "genius
and meditations and skill of individuals"; and (3) provide incentives for creators or inventors.
Id. (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
136. Id.
137. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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infringing parties. 138 The general rule of the Federal Circuit went in
the opposite direction, making injunctions almost automatic when
they should instead be granted with "considerable discretion."' 139 The
Court concluded by stating that the present case addressed nothing
more than district courts' use of the traditional principles of equity in
their decisions to grant or deny injunctive relief.140
D. The Concurring Opinions
The two concurring opinions agreed on the use of the traditional
four-factor test, but diverged in their reasoning. Chief Justice Roberts
found that the equitable considerations are justified by the "difficulty
of protecting a right to exclude" where a court limits damages to mon-
etary awards. 14' Justice Kennedy did not justify the four-factor test on
the right to exclude; 42 however, he agreed with Chief Justice Roberts
that the pattern of issuing an injunction in infringement cases was the
result of applying the four-factor test. 143 Justice Kennedy then
weighed in on so-called "patent trolls" and business method pat-
ents. 144 Three justices joined Justice Kennedy in questioning the "po-
138. The Court went to great lengths to carve out a niche for inventors who are unable to
market their patented technologies without the help of others:
For example, some patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inven-
tors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to
secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves. Such patent
holders may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for
categorically denying them the opportunity to do so .... The [district] court's categori-
cal rule is also in tension with [Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.],
which rejected the contention that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunc-
tive relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined to use the patent.
eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840-41 (citing Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,
422-30 (1908)). This niche will probably not be large enough to include patent holders outside
of these two groups. The language surrounding the exceptions has caused some to infer that the
exceptions will serve as more of an exclusive list. See Anthony Zeuli, eBay v. MercExchange,
NAT'L L.J., June 26, 2006, at 13.
139. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
140. Id.
141. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
142. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy used the language of the major-
ity's opinion to rebut Chief Justice Roberts's right-to-exclude reasoning: "Both the terms of the
Patent Act and the traditional view of injunctive relief accept that the existence of a right to
exclude does not dictate the remedy for violation of that right." Id.
143. Id. Additionally, Justice Kennedy noted that the mere existence of a historical trend due
to the circumstances of the cases could not justify the general rule advanced by the Federal
Circuit. Id.
144. Justice Kennedy did not refer to "patent trolls" by name, but instead generally described
their practices and how their business models affect the calculus of the four-factor test. Id. The
phrase "patent troll" is a slang term for a company that exists solely to enforce its patent rights
and generates revenue only through licensing its patents. Terrence P. McMahon et al., Who is a
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tential vagueness and suspect validity" of business method patents.145
Interestingly, these dicta directly conflict with the Federal Circuit's
statements admonishing the district court for denying injunctive relief
based on a general concern for the validity of business method pat-
ents. 146 The eBay Court thus appears to silently reaffirm the district
court's opinion that public policy weighs against issuance of a perma-
nent injunction for business method patents.147
IV. ANALYSIS
In eBay, the Supreme Court sought a return to traditional equitable
considerations for permanent injunctions. Whether the Court was
correct in adhering to the traditional equitable test is a difficult ques-
tion-one that will not be answered here. Instead, this Part asserts
that the decision will have the unintended effect of disproportionately
reducing the ability of business method patent holders to enforce their
rights. Two factors predict this outcome. First, Justice Kennedy's con-
currence will have a chilling effect on the rights granted by business
method patents.148 Second, the rejection of the general rule granting
permanent injunctions against infringement further weakens the posi-
tion of a business method patent holder. 149 This Part concludes by
arguing in favor of informing equitable considerations with a pre-
sumption of irreparable harm for business method patent
infringement.15 0
Troll? Not a Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159, 159-66 (2006) (discussing the difficulties of
determining a bright-line definition for patent trolls).
145. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The district
court had given weight to a similar "growing concern over the issuance of business-method pat-
ents" in finding that the public interest was against permanently enjoining eBay. MercExchange,
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 713-14 (E.D. Va. 2003). The district court used the
Business Method Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001), as evidence of how
the public interest would not be served by permanently enjoning eBay. MercExchange, 275 F.
Supp. 2d at 714. "While [the general concern over business method patents] is certainly not
dispositive, it lends significant weight against the imposition of an injunction, particularly in this
case where the patentee does not practice its patents, nor has any intention of practicing its
patents." Id.
147. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 160-168 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
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A. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence Will Have a Chilling Effect upon
the Rights Granted by Business Method Patents
Three Justices joined Justice Kennedy in noting the "potential
vagueness and suspect validity" of business method patents. 151 Courts
and litigants will undoubtedly use this statement to argue against
awarding permanent injunctions for business method patents. 152 Jus-
tice Kennedy failed to cite any authority, but his belief undoubtedly
flows from the briefs of the parties and amici curiae, which contained
references disparaging business method patents. 53
Justice Kennedy also indicated his concern that injunctive relief
may have different consequences for business methods, noting that
they were "not of much economic and legal significance in earlier
times."' 54 His opinion does a two-step of sorts; the first being his use
of the phrase "in earlier times," which subtly promotes judicial wari-
ness of business methods by stressing their recent vintage. Next, Jus-
tice Kennedy takes a somewhat shorter step backward, stating how
the Patent Act is "well suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid
technological and legal developments in the patent system."'1 55
Academics have been making the first step's historical argument for
years, with at least one author going so far as to argue that awarding
business method patents is a violation of the plain meaning of the
Constitution. 156 In addition to the fact that some of the driving forces
behind the need for business method patents-the computer and the
Internet-are relatively new technologies, the business method excep-
tion is also to blame for keeping business methods out of the judicial
consciousness for over a century. New technologies often stretch the
151. eBay. Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
152. See Zeuli, supra note 138.
153. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Petitioner at 3-5, eBay, Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct.
1837 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 690255, at *3-5 (citing Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too
Many Intellectual Property Rights?, 9 MARO. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173, 184-85 (2005), for the
proposition that "[i]n the old days, [business methods] would have been thought non-patentable
[and] would have been considered the kind of normal business innovation that is driven by in-
centives that did not depend on propertization"); Brief Amicus Curiae of Electronic Frontier
Foundation in Support of Petitioners, eBay, Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
(No. 05-130), 2005 WL 2381067 (describing public policy reasons against validity of business
method patents).
154. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. Id. Justice Kennedy also stressed the need to take these changes into account when ap-
plying precedent. "For these reasons it should be recognized that district courts must determine
whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases before them." Id. at 1842-43.
156. Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common
Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 61, 119 (2002).
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meaning of "[s]cience and useful [a]rts" for which Congress has au-
thority to grant a patent; it is therefore implicit in the policies behind
the patent system that this definition continue to expand in order to
encourage progress. t57
As for the second step, the patent system's ability to deal in similar
ways with new and changing technologies has been a driving force
behind this country's success. 158 The adaptability of the patent system
may benefit many new technologies in their pursuit of patentability;
however, business methods have been excised out of this group be-
cause of their "potential vagueness and suspect validity."1 59 The net
effect of this split is not only to set business methods apart from ex-
isting technologies by questioning their validity, but also to distinguish
them from future potentially patentable technologies. Justice Ken-
nedy's statements provide ample deterrents-relative ambiguity and
questionable validity-to prevent risk-adverse district court judges
from affording business method patents the same level of deference
normally given to other technologies.
B. The Rejection of the Absolute Right to Exclude Harms
Business Method Patent Holders
The eBay Court further weakened the position of business method
patent holders when it dispensed with the Federal Circuit's general
rule in favor of permanent injunctions.160 The Court rejected the ap-
proach taken by the Federal Circuit, because, although a patent grants
its owner the right to exclude, the Patent Act provides only that in-
junctions "may" issue to prevent the violation of patent rights. 161 Un-
fortunately, as the Court extricated the automatic issuance rule from
case law, it also overturned the well-established Federal Circuit prece-
dent that justified the presumptive award of injunctive relief-that
"the right to exclude is but the essence of the concept of property." 62
The right of a business method patent holder to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the business method is the most valuable
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
158. This point was well articulated in an amicus brief for another case that pushed the limits
of patentable subject matter-Diamond v. Chakrabarty. See Brief on Behalf of Genentech, Inc.,
Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-136), 1980 WL
339766, at *4-5.
159. Cf eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 1839-40 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at 1840 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)).
162. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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right her patent grants.1 63 The right to exclude is, for two main rea-
sons, particularly important for business methods. First, many types
of business methods, particularly Internet-based business methods,
function like a "black box"-consumers have no idea what the provi-
sion of the services entails.1 64 For example, consider a business
method patent for an online shopping cart licensed to a customer's
favorite online retailer.1 65 Without the right to exclude, the patent
holder would be hard-pressed to prevent a competitor from designing
a "brown box" to provide a similar shopping cart and selling it to
other retailers. 166
Second, the value of a business method may not lie in how it works,
but rather in the inventor's ability to obtain a monopoly over the in-
vention through patenting. 167 Many business methods, such as the 1-
Click patent, have little value directly attributable to their technical
merit; instead, their value lies in the right to exclude others from prac-
ticing a relatively revolutionary advancement. 168 Without an absolute
ability to displace potential infringers, business method patent holders
are crippled in asserting the statutory rights obtained in exchange for
disclosure of their ingenuity.
163. Before the modern Patent Act, the Supreme Court described the right to exclude as the
only right conferred by a patent. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 510 (1917). Section 154(a)(1) expressly grants the right to exclude, but does not de-
scribe this right as the only right granted. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
164. See generally Alice Hill, Top 5 Reasons Your Customers Abandon Their Shopping Carts
(And What You Can Do About It), SMAR[ Bus. FOR THE NEW ECON., Mar. 2001. at 80.
165. Examples of "shopping cart" patents are Network Sales System, U.S. Patent No.
5.909,492 (filed June 18, 1997), and Network Sales System, U.S. Patent No. 5,715,314 (filed Oct.
24, 1994). See ChillingEffects.org, Chilling Effects Clearinghouse: E-Commerce Patents, http://
www.chillingeffects.org/ecom/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). Divine, Inc. owns both shopping cart
patents and has engaged in an aggressive licensing campaign targeting online merchants. Id.
The website "note[s] that even the U.S. Patent Office website has a 'shopping cart' feature." Id.
166. Due to the absence of research and development costs, the "brown box" would provide
the same or improved utility to consumers at a cost less than the black box. See Duncan M.
Davidson. Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1037, 1097-98 (1986).
167. See May Wong, High-Stakes Battle Waged Over Patents for Internet Techniques, Business
Methods. L.A. TIMES. July 17. 2000. at C5 (Orange Co. ed.) ("The frenzied pace of technological
innovation and an extremely competitive Internet marketplace are behind the surge. Dozens of
software developers and dot-corn executives could be developing similar business methods si-
multaneously, so securing a patent can be the key to survival.").
168. Amazon One-Click Shopping, http://cse.stanford.edu/class/cs201/projects-99-00/software-
patents/amazon.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2007). Industry studies had shown that between 60%
and 65% of online shopping carts were abandoned before checkout. In an effort to streamline
the process and recover those lost sales, Amazon invested in technology that would recognize
when a buyer returned to the website and locate previously stored credit card information.
Twenty-three days after issuance, Amazon brought suit against its largest competitor, Barnes
and Noble. which was using a one-click purchase system called "Express Lane." Jeff Bezos, the
CEO of Amazon, admitted that, while simple to duplicate, the 1-Click patent was revolutionary
when its competitors were locked into the idea of using shopping carts.
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C. A Presumption of Irreparable Harm Should Inform
Equitable Considerations
Although it is clear that the eBay Court overruled the automatic
issuance of injunctive relief, several Justices appeared to instruct dis-
trict courts to use prior experience, including Federal Circuit case law,
to limit legal discretion.1 69 In place of the Federal Circuit's general
rule granting an automatic injunction now stands a traditional equita-
ble test for permanent injunctions, but that does not mean that the
presumption of irreparable harm cannot be used to inform equitable
considerations. 170 As one author suggested, a presumption of irrepa-
rable harm may survive in some form, because the Court limited the
absolute nature of the property right, but did not disturb the underly-
ing justifications for the presumption.' 7' Whether the presumption
that infringement causes irreparable harm still exists, business method
patent holders can no longer expect district courts to issue permanent
injunctions after a finding of validity and infringement. This loss of an
absolute property right places business method patent holders at a dis-
tinct disadvantage and will prevent them from obtaining permanent
injunctive relief for patent infringement.
V. IMPACT
The eBay decision rights the course and purges any per se rules
from the permanent injunction analysis. But did the Court overcor-
rect, thereby creating a per se rule against the issuance of permanent
injunctions for infringement of valid patents? Additionally, how will
newer technologies, such as business methods, be able to satisfy the
traditional equitable considerations for permanent injunctions? Will
business method patent holders be able to analogize their injuries and
property rights to those found in cases awarding permanent injunc-
tions to owners of patents for traditional technologies? This Part ana-
169. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, appears to leave un-
touched Federal Circuit precedent outside of the automatic injunction realm. See eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy. J., concurring). See also Mitchell
G. Stockwell. Implementing eBay: New Problems in Guiding Judicial Discretion and Enforcing
Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 747, 749 (2006) ("The irreparable harm
'presumption derives in part from the finite term of the patent grant' and the fact that 'passage
of time can work irremediable harm.' eBay left untouched this underlying justification." (cita-
tions omitted)).
170. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting, with-
out questioning the use of the irreparable harm presumption, that "[t]he district court presumed
Abbott would suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction because of its conclusion regarding
likelihood of success on the merits").
171. Stockwell, supra note 169, at 749.
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lyzes the four-factor test and asserts that business method patent
holders will be unable to satisfy the traditional equitable considera-
tions for permanent injunctions. 17 2
A. Business Method Patent Holders Will Be Unable to
Show Irreparable Harm
Although irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies are
separate considerations, "whether something is 'irreparable' requires,
to a certain extent, a lack of [adequate] alternative remedies."' 73
Post-eBay courts will examine traditional indicia of irreparable
harm-damages that are nonmonetary in nature or difficult to value-
in determining whether remedies other than injunctive relief will cor-
rect the injury. 174
When a business method patent holder requests a permanent in-
junction, a district court will use the "long tradition of equity practice"
to determine irreparable harm. 75 Unfortunately, infringement of
business method patents will likely fail to raise the traditional indicia
of irreparable harm, because business methods do not compete in a
traditional marketplace. 76 Instead, business methods are frequently
practiced in two ways: (1) developed in-house and used by a com-
pany; or (2) licensed to a party that will implement the business
method in its practice.1 77 In the first situation, infringement may oc-
cur where another entity copies or independently develops the pat-
ented business method and "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" the
172. See infra notes 173-231 and accompanying text.
173. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1264 n.4 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2006). Alternatively, "irreparable injury is not an independent requirement for ob-
taining a permanent injunction; it is only one basis for showing the inadequacy of a legal rem-
edy." llA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2944 (2d
ed. 1995). Where monetary damages are adequate, there can be no irreparable injury, unless the
impact of infringement is unduly speculative. See supra notes 79-82.
174. See Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 417 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir. 1969) (accepting the
plaintiff's contention that irreparable injuries subsumed incalculable damages, including loss of
goodwill); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 403 F. Supp.
336. 343 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Ala. Dept. of Transp. v. Blue Ridge Sand & Gravel, Inc., 718 So. 2d
27, 32 (Ala. 1998) ("Loss of profits does not justify the issuance of an injunction.").
175. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
176. While patented inventions used in goods such as hybrid vehicles may create a compara-
tive advantage over another hybrid vehicle, business methods do not compete on such an apples-
to-apples basis. See Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL
2385139, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (distinguishing Paice's business, which generated
revenue from licensing patents, from Toyota's business, which generated revenue by producing
vehicles).
177. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. For example, mutual funds owned by the
same company could employ State Street's hub and spoke system, or the company could license
its system to other companies to allow a pooling of mutual fund assets.
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patented article.' 78 Because the business method was intended to be
used in-house, and not as a product in the marketplace, there would
be no loss of brand name recognition or market share.1 79 Thus, the
patentee would not be irreparably harmed, and infringement could
then be remedied by obtaining a royalty from the parties wrongfully
using the intellectual property.
Where the business method patent holder actively licenses his busi-
ness method to other parties, there would still be an absence of irrepa-
rable harm. Where a party misappropriates the patent holder's
business method and sells it to a customer, the patent holder has lost a
sale, because there is one less potential customer. 80 Alternatively,
the misappropriating party may copy or independently develop the
patented business method for use in-house, thereby causing the busi-
ness method patent holder to lose a sale to a different customer. 181 In
both cases, the infringement may cause a loss of profits, market share,
and research and development opportunities. 182 It may also damage
the patent holder's brand name.
However, any loss of profits may be remedied by an effective roy-
alty program, which would put the patent holder in as good a financial
178. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
179. Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5.
180. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
("Microsoft's use of z4's intellectual property does not exclude z4 from selling or licensing its
product to any sector of the market or threaten z4's brand name recognition or good will in any
way. z4 is only excluded from selling or licensing its technology to Microsoft."). A party in
possession of an infringing business method has little incentive to pay for a license. However,
once a party is put on notice that it is using an infringing business method, this can establish
willful infringement, thereby subjecting it to punitive damages. See Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic
Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Enhancement [of damages] is not a substitute for
perceived inadequacies in the calculation of actual damages, but depends on a showing of willful
infringement or other indicium of bad faith warranting punitive damages.").
181. Not only would the business method patent holder lose a customer, he would not neces-
sarily know that he has suffered a loss. Nor would he be able to pursue legal action against the
continued infringement. See Alan Wright, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and Process Patent Protection, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 603, 606 (1994) ("Compared to proving in-
fringement of a product, proving infringement of a process is more difficult because products are
tangible and typically in the stream of commerce, while processes are typically conducted
outside public view."). See also William E. Ridgway, Note, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation
Policy Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1245 (2006) (reasoning that a process
patent holder will have to file more legal actions because of the difficulty of detection).
182. A court would analyze the sale lost due to infringement in a manner analogous to the
process described in supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text. In the hypothetical situation of
companies independently creating the business method or purposely copying it, there is only one
infringing party involved at a time. Although there may be many individual entities that the
patent holder must pursue in court, it would be unlikely that courts would find infringement by
one entity to be irreparable-the court could simply require a forced license to compensate for
the lost sale.
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position as if he had licensed the business method to the infringing
user or seller.' 83 While a court-ordered royalty program may reclaim
profits taken by the infringing party, the parties who bought from the
infringing seller would still be using a product not licensed by the pat-
ent holder. The market share test in post-eBay cases appears to center
on whether the infringing seller's buyers cannot be reclaimed 184 or,
alternatively, whether the effect of early market share results in a dif-
ferent subsequent arrangement of the marketplace.' 85 Business meth-
ods, and especially Internet-based business methods, will be unable to
trigger either of these tests due to the ever-changing market environ-
ment. Licensees of business methods are not "sticky"-they will ac-
quire the product that will provide them with a competitive
advantage. 86 Nor will failure to enjoin infringement of a business
method cause a permanent change to the future composition of a mar-
ket, because free and emerging markets will adapt around a business
method that guarantees one party a monopoly on a market
segment. 187
If a patented technology competes in a marketplace, infringement
by others may result in loss of brand name reputation or loss of good-
will.1 88 Owners of business method patents can distinguish their prod-
183. See Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5 (reasoning that losses caused by sales of infringing
products can be remedied through a royalty set by the jury). This requires the court to deter-
mine how many sales the infringing party made, which is easier than determining the number of
parties that could have independently invented an infringing business method and used it in-
house.
184. See Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 983 (W.D. Tenn.
2006); Tivo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006) ("One
thing the parties agree on is that DVR customers are 'sticky customers,' that is they tend to
remain customers of the company from which they obtain their first DVR .... [Thus,] Defend-
ants' continued infringement is shaping the market to Plaintiff's disadvantage and results in long-
term customer loss.").
185. Controlling a market at an early stage is critical to ensuring market share as the market
matures. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-
2910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006); see also Tivo, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 670
("[Tivo's] primary focus is on growing a customer base specifically around the product with
which Defendants' infringing product competes. And, as [Tivo] is a relatively new company with
only one primary product, loss of market share and of customer base as a result of infringement
cause severe injury."); z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
186. See Tivo, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (noting that DVR buyers tend to "stick" to the company
that sold them their first DVR).
187. See Kelly Hershey, Scheiber v. Dolby Laboratories, Inc.. 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159,
164 (2003) ("Only where an innovation creates an entirely new market, or represents a quantum
advance in an old one, is the patent likely to confer an economic monopoly.").
188. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels, 719 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D. Ohio 1989)
(noting Chrysler's argument that consumers would mistake an infringing lower-quality replace-
ment fender for stock equipment on a pickup truck- thus, if the fender's finish was faulty, it
would reflect poorly on Chrysler).
EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE
ucts and brand names by way of top-notch customer support,
exceptional products, or similar methods. 189 But infringement of a
business method patent will have a different effect on the intangible
assets of one's brand name than infringement of any other type of
technology. When an infringing party uses, sells, or independently de-
velops the patented business method, any ill will generated due to the
business method is not directed toward the business method patent
holder, but toward the party who provided the customer with the mis-
appropriated business method. 190
A party that holds and actively licenses a patent for a traditional
technology may be irreparably injured in the form of decreased re-
search and development capacity due to an infringing party selling the
patented technology. 19 To be irreparable, such a loss must constitute
more than a loss of funding because of decreased revenues attributa-
ble to the infringing party. 92 All business methods undoubtedly re-
quire research and development; however, this process is not
irrevocably foreclosed by customers' purchase or use of an infringing
product. 193 Because business methods involve the way a business is
"structured, managed, organized [or] carried out,"'1 94 an infringing use
or sale of a business method actually benefits the patent holder by
giving him an opportunity to examine how the patent is utilized in a
broader range of applications. Accordingly, business method patent
holders will be unable to satisfy the irreparable harm prong due to the
differences between business methods and traditional technologies
used throughout the "long tradition of equity practice."' 95
189. See John Jantsch, 10 Ways to Make Your Business Stand Out, http://www.businessknow-
how.com/marketing/dominate.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
190. For example, assume A owns a business method patent covering business method
software (BMS); B reverse engineers the BMS, then turns around and sells a BMS knockoff to
C. Even though the BMS is the same product being offered by A, possibly causing some con-
sumers to be confused as to who first invented the BMS, C is going to address any complaints
regarding the BMS with B, not A. If B instead began employing the patented technology in-
house and did not sell it, why would B think less of A when B has knowingly infringed?
191. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 983 (W.D. Tenn. 2006)
("The loss of sales due to competition... inhibits the company's ability to develop new products
because it interferes with the relationships Smith & Nephew is able to form with surgeons.").
192. If loss of funding were enough, nearly every infringed upon patent holder could prove
irreparable harm. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
The Eli Lilly court also noted that injury to research efforts "is not materially different from any
claim of injury by a business that is deprived of funds that it could usefully reinvest." Id.
193. By selling (or giving) customers of the infringing seller(s) a license, the patent holder
could establish lines of communication between himself and the customers. This would allow
research and development feedback beyond that obtained through the patent holder's sales.
194. Melton, supra note 23, at 103.
195. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
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B. Business Method Patent Holders Cannot Show an
Inadequacy of Remedies at Law
The inadequacy of remedies available at law is an equitable deter-
mination made by a district court based on the facts of each case.1 96 If
the district court finds that there is an available remedy at law, the
remedy must "be plain and adequate ... to [achieve] the ends of jus-
tice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity."' 197 A
court may find that, even if damages can be clearly calculated, a rem-
edy at law is not an equitable solution given the circumstances of the
case. 198 However, business method patent holders will be unable to
successfully argue that compulsory licensing or monetary damages fail
to meet "the ends of justice."1 99
Post-eBay decisions provide insight into the likely considerations
that district courts will examine in deciding whether to grant injunc-
tive relief to a business method patent holder. The reasoning in these
opinions laid an analytical framework producing an insurmountable
burden for business method patent holders seeking to establish the
inadequacy of remedies available at law.20 0 The eBay Court stated
that an injunction "may" issue upon violation of the patent holder's
right to exclude, thereby overruling the dispositive weight the Federal
Circuit gave such a violation.20' A district court will therefore ex-
amine whether other factors, combined with the violation of a patent
holder's right to exclude, establish the inadequacy of remedies availa-
ble at law. These factors typically encompass the traditional indicia of
irreparable harm that are difficult to remedy with monetary damages,
such as loss of market share, consumer goodwill, or brand name
recognition.20 2
196. Id.
197. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 984 (W.D. Tenn. 2006)
(quoting Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1259 1266 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2006)).
198. Id. (noting that even if a value could be placed on lost profits and other tangible dam-
ages, the result would not necessarily be equitable, because it would allow the infringement to
continue).
199. Id. (quoting Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1266).
200. See, e.g., Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (refusing to enjoin Toyota's infringing use of a patented transmission
component on its Prius hybrid vehicle); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying injunctive relief to a plaintiff holding a patent for product activation
software included within Microsoft Office and Windows).
201. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839-40.
202. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-
2910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
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Unfortunately for business method patent holders seeking injunc-
tive relief, these damages are more accurately determined for business
methods than for other types of technologies. Any market share loss
due to infringement of a business method patent is more easily and
clearly calculated than for other technologies, because potential cus-
tomers for business method patents are less "sticky. ' 20 3 Additionally,
a business method patent holder may reclaim lost consumers through
forced licensing if market forces are insufficient to convince the con-
sumers to purchase licenses at market rates.204 If a company is in-
fringing a business method patent under its own name, damage to
consumer goodwill or brand name recognition of the business method
patent holder will be readily calculable, as there are no damages to the
patent holder. 20 5 Instead, any ill will arising against a business method
is directed against the infringing party who provided the misappropri-
ated business method. 20 6
Courts may also examine the relative importance of a patented bus-
iness method to an infringing product and will likely find that Justice
Kennedy's "suspect validity" admonition forces the conclusion that
remedies available at law are adequate. 20 7 Justice Kennedy warned
that, when a patented technology constitutes a "small portion" of an
infringing product, an injunction could be against the public interest,
because monetary damages may be enough to compensate the patent
203. Purchasers of business methods are less sticky, because the end users are likely to be
even less sticky. An example of this phenomenon is eBay's technique to keep users on its web-
site. See Mary M. Calkins, Comment, My Reputation Always Had More Fun Than Me: The
Failure of eBay's Feedback Model to Effectively Prevent Online Auction Fraud, 7 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 33 (2001). See also James E. Landis, Note, Amazon.com: A Look at Patenting Computer
Implemented Business Methods Following State Street, 2 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 27-28 (2001) (rea-
soning that a buyer will not recognize whether a convenience, in this case the 1-Click business
method, is patented or not; customers are only interested in the convenience of their interaction
with the business).
204. See Dean Alderucci & Kurt Maschoff, Patenting the New Business Model: Building
Fences in Cyberspace, 589 PLI/PAT 205, 222-26 (2004) (discussing considerations regarding li-
censing business methods to preexisting entities).
205. The difference between infringing a patent and using the invention disclosed by the pat-
ent has been summarized as follows:
An infringer, however, does not infringe the patented product but rather the patent
itself. Accordingly, damage to the business reputation or goodwill of the patentee
stemming from patent infringement must flow from the patent to the patented product
to the patentee-a three-link chain. As a result, the nexus between the patent infringe-
ment and the damage may be quite attenuated and difficult to prove.
Christopher S. Marchese, Patent Infringement and Future Lost Profits Damages, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
747, 780 (1994) (emphasis in original).
206. See supra notes 164, 166 and accompanying text.
207. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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holder.20 8 A business method patent holder could argue that, because
business methods are inherently a broader technology, they are less
likely to serve a de minimis role within an infringing product. 20 9 This
reasoning appears to weigh against the adequacy of remedies availa-
ble at law. However, Justice Kennedy was concerned with the situa-
tion where a patent holder tries to extort disproportionate licensing
fees by using his patent monopoly, not with creating a dispositive li-
censing test based on the relative importance of the patented
technology. 210
Finally, the actual or potential licensing opportunities available to a
business method patent holder will convince a district court that ade-
quate remedies at law are available. The eBay Court disapproved of
any categorical rules, such as willingness to license, in the traditional
four-factor test.21 1 But that does not prohibit a district court from
treating licensing activity as evidence that monetary damages are ade-
quate.2 12 Even when the business method patent holder has not of-
fered to license to another party, courts will believe that a forced
license affirms the patent holder's patent rights equally as well as a
permanent injunction.213 The counterargument is that, if one infringer
merely has to pay for a compulsory license, other parties will not be
deterred from infringement. 214 But this argument ignores the effect of
a prior finding of patent validity and the immense transaction costs
208. Id.
209. See William Fisher et al., Business Method Patents Online, Harvard Law Sch. Berkman
Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/mexico_2006_module_7obmp (last
visited Sept. 18, 2007) (providing examples of business method patents that broadly cover areas
of Internet commerce and banking).
210. Such a test would require an impossible threshold determination of whether or not the
patented technology constituted enough of the infringing product to require an injunction. In
determining a "small portion," would courts look to the value the patented technology added to
the infringing product? Further, would "value" mean monetary value or functional value?
211. The Court addressed the district court's use of the patent holder's "willingness to license
its patents" and its "lack of commercial activity in practicing its patents." eBay, 126 S. Ct. at
1840 (majority opinion) (arguably carving out a niche for "university researchers or self-made
inventors," who prefer to merely license their patents and might be unable to satisfy the tradi-
tional four-factor test).
212. See Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). But see Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Global-
SantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
213. Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5 ("[T]he entry of a judgment for monetary relief in con-
junction with the jury's infringement and validity findings will affirm Plaintiff's patent rights, as
would the issuance of an injunction.").
214. The reasoning is that potential infringers can either buy a license from the patent holder,
or they can take the chance that the patent holder will never discover their infringement. If the
patent holder does discover the infringement, the penalty will only be the cost of the license that
they avoided in the first place. See Transocean, 2006 WL 3813778. at *5.
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involved in patent litigation.215 Whether or not a business method
patent holder seeks to license his technology, a district court will likely
conclude that a compulsory licensing scheme will adequately compen-
sate for infringement.
C. Business Method Patent Holders Cannot Tilt the Balance of
Hardships in Their Favor
"One who elects to build a business on a product found to infringe
cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against continuing in-
fringement destroys the business so elected. ' 216 This reasoning would
seem to carry considerable weight for business method patents be-
cause of their potential to cover an infringer's entire enterprise.
217
But the broad use of business methods will cause injunctive relief to
be denied for two reasons. First, as business methods continue to ex-
pand their role within every aspect of our daily lives, consumers, busi-
nesses, and governments will accordingly place greater reliance on
business methods-whether patented or not.218 This third party reli-
ance on infringing business methods will create significant hardship
that will weigh in favor of the infringing party.
Additionally, enjoining an infringing business method will cause sig-
nificant hardship for the infringing party. Even for a business method
that covers only a small fraction of a party's business activities, the
cost of an injunction can be staggering.219 But, if the infringing busi-
215. See Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the Use
of Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 253 (1995) ("Most
patent cases cost $500,000 at a minimum to litigate, and average over one million dollars in costs
per party. Frequently, cases will cost between two and five million dollars.").
216. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See William
C. Rooklidge, Reform of the Patent Laws: Forging Legislation Addressing Disparate Interests, 88
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 9, 15-16 (2006) (warning that these dicta should not be
considered in isolation; rather, they should be read in conjunction with Federal Circuit precedent
consistently giving district courts considerable equitable discretion).
217. See Christopher Hayes, Snap, Crackle Patents, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, http://www.
inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/2451 (discussing a small-business owner who is trying to pat-
ent a method and system for selling cereal in an ice cream store manner).
218. Healthcare is one example of a field in which business methods are increasing exponen-
tially. See John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. ME-
DIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 48 (1999) ("Medical practitioners have for decades obtained patents on
methods of medical treatment ranging from administering insulin to treating cancer."). Business
methods appear to be making the largest impact on the office-management side of health care.
See William T. Ellis & Aaron C. Chatterjee, Floodgates Open in the U.S. for Software Patents
Covering Financial Configurations and Business Models for Health Care Management and Insur-
ance, 11 HEALTH LAW. 4 (1998).
219. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 442-43 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
Although a court considering injunctive relief should weigh all the equities involved in any rem-
edy, placing a significant amount of weight on the injury to the infringing party rewards parties
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ness method is widely employed, an injunction could terminate all
business operations and put the party out of business-the most sig-
nificant of business hardships. 220 A district court will weigh these con-
sequences against the harm that the patent holder would suffer in the
absence of an injunction. 22' When the court examines the hardship to
the patent holder, it will conclude that, in the absence of equitable
relief, remedies available at law will be adequate to remedy business
method patent infringement. 222 Business method patent holders will
therefore be unable to establish any hardship that can overcome the
crippling effect an injunction would have on the infringing party.
D. Enjoining Infringing Business Methods Will Not
Serve the Public Interest
The public has an interest in enforcing the rights of patent holders,
which include injunctive relief to prevent infringement. 223 But the
public interest may weigh against injunctive relief where it would
cause serious public inconvenience or loss without a corresponding
advantage to the patent holder. 224 In the case of business methods,
courts will be unwilling to grant injunctive relief due to public reliance
on infringing methods and the adequacy of compulsory licensing in
vindicating business method patent rights. 225
who make infringement central to their business. This encourages currently infringing parties to
go "all-in" and attempt to create a level of infringement so staggering that ceasing the infringe-
ment would cost billions of dollars. Further, considering the damage to an infringing party will
allow large corporations to steam-roll small companies and individuals that own infringed upon
patents. If Microsoft sticks an infringing program somewhere within its Office or Windows
software, it will of course become so entrenched in PC-using society that no court would dare
issue an injunction.
220. See Ellis & Chatterjee, supra note 218, at 6 (discussing the ability of a business method
patent holder to exclude others from an entire business model). See also John J. Feldhaus, Pre-
liminary and Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 804 PLI/PAT 521, 553-54 (2004) (discussing
Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
where the trial court took into its equitable considerations for a preliminary injunction the fact
that an injunction might put the alleged infringer out of business).
221. See z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 443 ("[Tlhe potential hardships Microsoft could suffer if
the injunction were granted outweigh any limited and reparable hardships that z4 would suffer in
the absence of an injunction." (emphasis added)).
222. See supra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
223. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006); PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (upholding the district
court's balancing of the strong public policy in favor of enforcing patent rights against the public
interest in the infringer's product).
224. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440-41 (1944); Mobley v. Saponi Corp., 212
S.E.2d 287, 289 (Va. 1975).
225. See supra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
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As technology continues to pervade society, the public increasingly
relies on its availability.226 Public interest in favor of enjoining in-
fringing business methods is inversely proportional to public reliance
on the infringing use.22 7 Software- or Internet-based business meth-
ods may be substituted relatively quickly; however, even minor dis-
ruptions may cause damage so severe as to direct public interest
against an injunction.228 There may be more than one way to skin a
cat, but business methods are not fungible goods-a patent granting a
monopoly may foreclose the only way to carry on a particular pro-
cess.229 This absence of noninfringing substitutes tips the scale further
away from a business method patent holder.2 30 Finally, the public in-
terest in enforcing patent rights will be minimal for business method
patents. Compulsory licensing will be not only an adequate remedy
for infringement, but also a vindication of the public's interests in en-
forcing patent rights and avoiding business disruptions, albeit at the
cost of the patent holder's bargaining leverage. 231
226. In the foreseeable future, a direct connection could arise between public health and busi-
ness method patent rights. For example, if a patent was awarded for a particular method of
filling and monitoring medicine prescriptions over the Internet, an infringing company could
point to a large customer base of patients with limited mobility that depended on the infringer's
services to keep their medicines up to date. See also Allen S. Hammond, Reflections on the Myth
of Icarus in the Age of Information, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 407, 416
(2003) ("Given the growing social utility, increasing societal reliance and potentially critical evo-
lutionary role of communications technology, it is essential that we consider how we create,
deploy and use it."); Eugene M. Katz & Theodore F. Claypoole, Willie Sutton Is on the Internet:
Bank Security Strategy in a Shared Risk Environment, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 167, 203-04 (2001)
(discussing the public's increasing reliance on Internet-based banking and the attendant risks).
227. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
228. If an infringing business method is sufficiently relied upon, a patent holder should expect
rapid technological advances within the field to militate against an injunction where equitable
relief would drive the infringer from the market. See John W. Bagby, Business Method Patent
Proliferation: Convergence of Transactional Analytics and Technical Scientifics, 56 Bus. LAW.
423, 456-57 (2000). See also Jane Spencer & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Blank-berry Fear Seeps In:
Court Decision Not Expected to Pull The Rug Out From Under Those Who Rely on Handheld,
But It's Possible, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2006, at A43 ("[D]ozens of government agencies-
including the Los Angeles Police Department-are contemplating how they would operate with-
out BlackBerrys, which are currently used to alert police captains in the field about homicides.").
229. See Melton, supra note 23, at 103 ("Imagine if Federal Express had patented its innova-
tive method of distributing parcels, if cable television had been patented, or if someone at Xerox
had the perspicacity to give their patent attorneys free rein at Xerox Parc."); Peter J. Howe, A
Make-or-Break Court Case: Left As Is, Patent Verdict Could End Telecom's Days, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 7, 2005, at D1.
230. If there is no alternative noninfringing business method that could take its place, then the
public would prefer to keep the infringing business method rather than have no business method
at all. The public hardship that would be involved in switching to noninfringing alternatives is
also considered. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
231. See Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). The difference in bargaining power between a compulsory license and
an injunction was not lost on the court. "Although potential licensees will likely consider the
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VI. CONCLUSION
This is an exciting period in patent law, and scholars have the op-
portunity to witness the earliest stages of what is an effectively new
type of patentable subject matter-business methods. As with any
new technology, there are growing pains in patent prosecution and
occasional questions of patent quality, spurring substantial academic
and judicial skepticism. Justice Kennedy's concurrence touts the pat-
ent system's ability to handle new forms of technologies, but dismisses
any application of this flexibility to business methods, noting their
"potential vagueness and suspect validity. '232 These dicta will have a
chilling effect upon district courts' applications of the traditional four-
factor test for permanent injunctions. District courts will be inclined
to find that compulsory licensing is an adequate remedy at law for the
infringement of a business method patent, which will compel a finding
of no irreparable harm. Business method patent holders will also be
unable to satisfy the balance of hardship and public policy prongs be-
cause of the severe damage that enjoining a business method would
inflict on an infringer and the public's ever-increasing reliance on bus-
iness methods. Will eBay and its progeny reduce business method
holders to second-class citizens that are able to get a patent but unable
to enforce their rights? Only time will tell. But the eBay decision's
immediate impact is clear. Business method patent holders will now
be unable to satisfy the traditional four-factor test for a permanent
injunction as promulgated by the eBay Court.
Jonathan H. Urbanek*
outcome of this case in their licensing decisions, Plaintiff has not been prevented from continu-
ing its licensing efforts." Id.
232. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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